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// non-repudiation protocol (with malicious recipient)
// Markowitch & Roggeman [MR99]
// POPTA model based on the PTA model in:
// G. Norman, D. Parker and J. Sproston
// Model checking for probabilistic timed automata
// Formal Methods in System Design 43(2):164–190 (2013)
// dxp/gxn 04/09/14
popta
// observable variables (N is hidden)
observables
last, r, mess, ack, o, x, y
endobservables
// constants
const K; // range N is chosen over
const int ad = 1; // min time to send an ack
const int AD = 4; // deadline (if ack not arrived then end protocol)
module originator
// location of originator
o : [0..4];
// 0 - init
// 1 - send
// 2 - waiting
// 3 - finished
// 4 - error
N : [0..K]; // number of messages
ack : [0..K]; // number of acks the originator has received
x : clock;
invariant
(o=0 => true) &
(o=1 => x<=0) &
(o=2 => x<=AD) &
(o=3 => true)
endinvariant
// init
// get request (so set K)
[req] o=0 & K=1 -> 1/K : (o'=1) & (N'=1);
[req] o=0 & K=2 -> 1/K : (o'=1) & (N'=1)
+ 1/K : (o'=1) & (N'=2);
[req] o=0 & K=3 -> 1/K : (o'=1) & (N'=1)
+ 1/K : (o'=1) & (N'=2)
+ 1/K : (o'=1) & (N'=3);
[req] o=0 & K=4 -> 1/K : (o'=1) & (N'=1)
+ 1/K : (o'=1) & (N'=2)
+ 1/K : (o'=1) & (N'=3)
+ 1/K : (o'=1) & (N'=4);
[req] o=0 & K=5 -> 1/K : (o'=1) & (N'=1)
+ 1/K : (o'=1) & (N'=2)
+ 1/K : (o'=1) & (N'=3)
+ 1/K : (o'=1) & (N'=4)
+ 1/K : (o'=1) & (N'=5);
[req] o=0 & K=6 -> 1/K : (o'=1) & (N'=1)
+ 1/K : (o'=1) & (N'=2)
+ 1/K : (o'=1) & (N'=3)
+ 1/K : (o'=1) & (N'=4)
+ 1/K : (o'=1) & (N'=5)
+ 1/K : (o'=1) & (N'=6);
[req] o=0 & K=7 -> 1/K : (o'=1) & (N'=1)
+ 1/K : (o'=1) & (N'=2)
+ 1/K : (o'=1) & (N'=3)
+ 1/K : (o'=1) & (N'=4)
+ 1/K : (o'=1) & (N'=5)
+ 1/K : (o'=1) & (N'=6)
+ 1/K : (o'=1) & (N'=7);
[req] o=0 & K=8 -> 1/K : (o'=1) & (N'=1)
+ 1/K : (o'=1) & (N'=2)
+ 1/K : (o'=1) & (N'=3)
+ 1/K : (o'=1) & (N'=4)
+ 1/K : (o'=1) & (N'=5)
+ 1/K : (o'=1) & (N'=6)
+ 1/K : (o'=1) & (N'=7)
+ 1/K : (o'=1) & (N'=8);
// send
[message] o=1 & x<=0 -> (o'=2); // send first message immediately
// waiting
// ack arrives
[ack] o=2 & ack<N-1 & x<=AD -> (o'=1) & (ack'=min(ack+1,K)) & (x'=0); // not last
[ack] o=2 & ack=N-1 & x<=AD -> (o'=3) & (ack'=min(ack+1,K)) & (x'=0); // last
// no ack arrives within time bound
[noack] o=2 & x>=AD -> (o'=3) & (x'=0); // ack not arrived within expected interval (stop)
endmodule
module malicious_recipient
r : [0..3];
// 0 initial state
// 1 receive messages
// 2 send acks
// 3 recipient stops (either protocol finished or malicious behaviour)
mess : [0..K]; // number of mess the originator has received
last : [0..1]; // protocol is unfair
y : clock;
invariant
(r=0 => y<=0) &
(r=1 => true) &
(r=2 => true) &
(r=3 => y<=0) &
(r=4 => true)
endinvariant
[req] r=0 & y=0 -> (r'=1); // initiate protocol
[message] r=1 -> (r'=2) & (y'=0) & (mess'=min(mess+1,K)); // receive message
[ack] r=2 & y>=ad -> (r'=1) & (y'=0); // send ack
// decode (can only do this once as takes too long to start sending acks again)
[] r=2 -> (r'=3);
// decode yields message
[] r=3 & mess=N & ack<N -> (r'=4) & (last'=1); // unfair
[] r=3 & !(mess=N & ack<N) -> (r'=4); // fair
endmodule
// unfair state reached
label "unfair" = last=1;